When the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) announced its monetary policy panel decisions on Wednesday, it was widely expected that it would not change its key repurchase rate and retain its accommodation stance. After the 2020-21 contraction and the volatility of retail prices in the country, as the second Central Wave threatens a sharp recovery in output this financial year, our Central Bank can closely apply economic growth and inflation. Although 2-6% are in the recently re-confirmed tolerance band. Our daily infection number is alarming, with over 100,000 cases reported on Monday and triggering renewed blockades in various parts of the country. As long as our corona crisis continues, a broader phase of easy credit is needed to achieve resurgence. The services sector, which has been badly hit by the epidemic, is seeing another round of covid compression and job losses, despite losing manufacturing momentum. However, while support for growth is needed, policymakers should not miss out on rising inflationary losses in the medium term.
In February, retail inflation rose to 5.03 per cent from 4.06 per cent a month earlier. The combination of India’s current loose monetary and economic policies has worried bond traders that at some point we will have less cash than the supply of goods and services to keep prices stable. Already, the RBI is sweating to prevent the market yield on government debt from rising more than 6% over the long tenure of our yield curve, calling on traders to “be vigilant” to avoid paperwork that does not pay adequate premiums for compensation. While it is able to anchor price expectations with the RBI’s commitment to go after inflation with its policy tools, the need to boost and move the economy is still a priority, as last year, retail inflation surpassed RBI’s 6. Higher freight costs from crude oil to industrial inputs and hardening prices of goods have only recently begun to impose themselves on price tags.And overall productivity, at the same time, has not expanded greatly under our corona. Limitations. Contribute to the potential of ‘imported inflation’, the rise in US bond yields will have to draw capital out of India, push the rupee down and inflate our import bills. Only last year, central bank policies around the world may not be in sync — the US is on the brink of big financial gambling — so factors such as interest rate differences affect borderline flows and complicate policy formulation here.
Overall, this fiscal year and subsequent years will attend to a fair level of uncertainty as to how our growth-inflation dynamics will play out. In such circumstances, the RBI must abide by the basics of its mandate. Our central bank should now aim squarely for its inflation tolerance band’s median. Growth stimuli in India, on a shrinking basis, are more responsive to having a Kovid than a capital cost for a business, which is actually low right now. Suppression of Indian savers (and the like) by negative interest rates on bank deposits may be good in emergencies, but it will not be possible for long. This is not only unfair, it can push savers towards risky options, create conditions for a liquidity trap and ultimately distort our financial mediation system. Easy money is good, but rupee stability is not at a cost.